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The coronavirus pandemic accelerates some of the global trends that 
fueled the EU’s geopolitical ambition while raising the challenges that 
come with its enactment. This policy paper reviews the implications for 
the EU while focusing on three key relationships: China, the US and Af-
rica. It argues that the pandemic represents an opportunity for EU glob-
al leadership and shows what that could look like.
II
Executive summary
The coronavirus pandemic has important implications for the EU’s geopolitical am-
bition. It accelerates several global trends that led the EU to formulate this ambition 
and poses new challenges for its enactment. There is a real danger that an EU strug-
gling with the economic and political consequences of the pandemic gets stuck in 
a prolonged phase of introspective self-examination well beyond the current crisis. 
This policy paper reviews the implications for the EU’s global role by focusing on 
three relationships that are at the top of its geopolitical agenda and for which major 
advancements were expected in 2020: China, the US and Africa. The analysis of the 
early stages of the global pandemic shows that:
•	 It opened a new chapter of strategic and systemic rivalry with China as an EU 
struggling with internal solidarity fell prey to the global war of narratives led by 
China and the US. 
•	 It broadened the strategic void in transatlantic relations as the US failed to dis-
play global leadership and further eroded European trust through a marked 
“America First” approach. 
•	 It will enhance strategic challenges emanating from Africa where a potential 
health crisis will coincide with a significant economic downturn. 
In this policy paper, we argue that the pandemic could also represent an opportunity 
for the EU to display international responsibility and fill the global leadership gap 
that others leave. The EU should thus counteract tendencies of a myopic inward fo-
cus and adapt its geopolitical agenda for the pandemic global aftermath. It should: 
1. Defend and promote the European model in the global battle of narratives 
through a well-coordinated communication strategy and a strong normative 
stance 
2. Double down on European strategic sovereignty in the health, economic and 
defence sectors
3. Fill the leadership gap on multilateralism by bolstering existing and forging 
new alliances 
4. Engage in cooperation with China to support African recovery  
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Introduction
In 2019, the EU made grand promises to enhance its strategic sovereignty, become 
more “geopolitical”, and speak the “language of power”.1 These promises stand 
for the ambition to defend the EU’s collective interests and values in a context of 
great power competition. One year later, a global pandemic is severely challenging 
the bloc’s geopolitical ambition. It is accelerating some of the global trends that 
pushed the EU to endorse this more geopolitical role. Next to even fiercer great 
power competition, these include the erosion of the rules-based international or-
der, increasing protectionism, transatlantic tensions, the rise of China and grow-
ing instability in the EU’s neighbourhood. The pandemic thus raises the case for a 
more geopolitical EU. 
However, it also enhances the challenges that come with it. Adding to the dif-
ficulties related to the fragmented nature of the EU as a global actor,2 a Europe 
struggling with the pandemic’s economic consequences could easily get stuck in 
a prolonged phase of introspective self-examination. When the EU became the 
epicentre of the pandemic in March, its focus rapidly turned inwards, displaying 
by and large uncoordinated responses to the crisis. At the time of writing, the first 
steps towards more European solidarity and coordination were underway. How-
ever, economic responses remain controversial and the broader political repercus-
sions are still uncertain. There is thus a real danger that the EU’s inward focus will 
be retained well beyond the immediate crisis. 
In this paper, we argue that the pandemic calls for more, not less global EU leader-
ship. It is therefore crucial to keep sight of the transition out of the immediate 
emergency and to start thinking about concrete articulations of the EU’s global 
role in a post-crisis scenario. In the following, we illustrate the pandemic’s geopo-
litical implications with a focus on three relationships that are at the very top of 
the EU’s agenda: China (1), the US (2), and Africa (3). We then draw lessons for the 
EU’s future steps towards more global leadership (4). The EU will have to strength-
en its own strategic sovereignty in the health, economic and security spheres. At 
the same time, it should fill the current global leadership vacuum by cooling the 
war of narratives and promoting a European model, deepening multilateral coop-
eration, and joining forces with China to promote African recovery. 
1 EU-China relations: a new chapter of  
strategic rivalry 
The coronavirus, which originated in China in late 2019, hit at a decisive time for 
EU-China relations. The two have been working on renegotiating the terms of 
their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership since the early 2010s and agreed to 
deepen cooperation on a range of issues.3 In light of the scale and speed of China’s 
ascent, the EU gradually shifted to adopting a more realistic tone, culminating in 
1 Von der Leyen, Ursula, A Union that strives for more – my agenda for Europe, Brussels, 2019; 
Borrell, Josep, Hearing in the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Strasbourg, 
7 October 2019. 
2 Koenig, Nicole, The geopolitical European Commission and its pitfalls, Jacques Delors Centre, 
December 2019. 
3 EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 23 November 2013. 
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its designation of China as an economic competitor and “systemic rival promoting 
alternative models of governance” in 2019.4 The trade war with the US and EU 
member state divisions on Huawei’s 5G technologies further complicated EU-Chi-
na relations. There was some hope that 2020 would ease trade tensions with the 
US and lead to progress on the cooperative dimension of EU-China relations. In-
stead, the pandemic exacerbated tensions with the US and opened a new chapter 
of strategic rivalry. 
China had a delayed and authoritarian crisis response. Against the background 
of its authoritarian political model and its system of information control, China 
discouraged the transparent recognition of the threat and prevented a quick in-
ternational emergency response.5 After President Xi finally publicly acknowledged 
the coronavirus outbreak end-January 20206, an unprecedented number of severe 
government measures were put in place, including the months-long lockdown 
of the megacity of Wuhan, monitored through electronic surveillance measures. 
China also imposed a drastic travel ban on all foreign nationals, preventing even 
foreigners with a residence permit from entering the country. 
At the same time, China has started a so-called “mask diplomacy”7, offering sup-
port to other countries by sending equipment and medical teams. The Chinese 
“mask diplomacy” represents an attempt to redefine the international narrative 
around the pandemic and reveals China’s pretensions to global leadership. Yet, 
instead of fostering international collaboration, China’s “politics of generosity” 
contributed to a global battle of narratives. As outlined in a special report from 
the European External Action Service (EEAS),8 Beijing has carried out large-scale 
disinformation activities related to the coronavirus. The Chinese state-controlled 
media has not only depicted China’s approach to tackling the virus as superior, but 
also spread false theories about the origin of the virus. Moreover, Beijing engaged 
in an information war with Washington, using social media to point fingers at the 
US and ordering the expulsion of US journalists.9 In attempts to influence global 
public opinion, Chinese officials dramatically increased their presence on West-
ern social media platforms while Chinese-originated information manipulation 
increasingly resembled Russian-style tactics.10
The pandemic opened a new chapter of “systemic rivalry” between China and 
the EU. Against the background of China’s attempts to depict itself as a leader in 
global efforts to contain the crisis, there has been a growing trend of an anti-Eu-
ropean narrative, threatening European unity and values. The case of Italy shows 
that China’s “mask diplomacy” had a divisive impact on an EU struggling with its 
initial response to the crisis. Chinese assistance came at a time when intra-Euro-
pean solidarity was low and even though the EU and its member states provided 
more support to Italy than China, given the delay, the EU got less credit for it. At 
the same time, China has promoted its own authoritarian model of pandemic re-
4 European Commission and EU High Representative, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, Brussels, 
12 March 2019. 
5 The Associated Press, China didn’t war public of likely pandemic for 6 key days, 15 April 2020. 
6 Ma, Jian, Xi Jingping has buried the truth about coronavirus, The Guardian, 26 February 2020. 
7 Wong, Brian, China’s Mask Diplomacy, The Diplomat, 25 March 2020. 
8 European External Actions Service (EEAS), Special Report Update: Short assessment of 
narratives and disinformation around the COVID- 19 pandemic, Brussels, 1 April 2020. 
9 Lee Myers, Steven, China Spins Tale That the U.S. Army Started the Coronavirus Epidemic, 
New York Times, 13 March 2020. 
10 See here. 
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sponse. Most European countries have opted for a “democratic closure”11 in line 
with the EU’s fundamental rights system. Even so, Chinese support to countries 
like Italy or Spain also increased calls to learn lessons from the authoritarian Chi-
nese approach to contain the virus.12 More importantly, the example of Hungary 
shows that there is an authoritarian temptation that could well outlive the crisis 
and put basic European democratic rights at risk.13 
Despite mounting EU-China tensions, the pandemic could also offer some pros-
pects for Sino-European collaboration in the framework of the EU-China Strategic 
Partnership. As outlined by Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, global leadership “will 
also require effectively cooperating with China, rather than getting consumed by 
a war of narratives”.14 As a sign of EU international leadership, European policy-
makers need to acknowledge China’s display of international solidarity in the cur-
rent crisis and provide a unified EU response to it. The special EU-China summit 
– bringing together all 27 European heads of state or government – scheduled for 
September, could represent an opportunity to speak with a single EU voice and be 
a first step towards easing Sino-European frictions. However, there is also a risk 
that China exploits the Summit for public diplomacy purposes and that concrete 
measures will be postponed. The Summit should therefore focus on key delivera-
bles, such as the comprehensive investment agreement, as well as Sino-European 
support for multilateral initiatives to fight the immediate health crisis and the 
long-term economic effects. 
2 Transatlantic relations: a strategic void
The pandemic arrived after years of serious transatlantic tensions that had under-
lined the need for greater European sovereignty. The Trump administration dis-
mantled key pillars of the multilateral rules-based order by withdrawing from the 
Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. Trump repeatedly pressured Europeans 
to raise defence spending, questioning the security guarantee and threatening to 
withdraw the US from NATO. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has pursued 
an aggressive trade strategy, including not only a trade war with China, but also 
the imposition of significant import tariffs on the EU. The issue of 5G and Huawei 
shows how American pressure on Europeans to take sides in the competition with 
China is mounting. The pandemic highlighted the end of US hegemony while the 
“America First” approach to it led to yet another low point in transatlantic relations.
Trump initially downplayed the severity of the coronavirus threat describing it as 
“hoax”. However, when case numbers started rising turning the US into the pan-
demic’s new epicentre, it became clear that the country was unprepared. Faced 
with criticism regarding his initial crisis response, Trump engaged in global blame 
shifting and thus fuelled the global battle of narratives: Addressing American cit-
izens on 11 March, he said that the Europeans had failed to impose the necessary 
 
11 Tocci, Nathalie, International Order and the European Project in Times of COVID-19, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, March 2020. 
12 Arostegui, Martin, Chinese Virus Aid to Europe Raises Long-Term Concerns, VOA News, 
23 March 2020. 
13 Serhan, Yasmeen, The EU Watches as Hungary Kills Democracy, The Atlantic, 2 April 2020. 
14 Campbell, Kurt M. and Doshi, Rush, The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order, China 
is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters, Foreign Affairs, 
18 March 2020. 
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travel restrictions on China and that clusters of infection “were seeded” by Eu-
ropean travellers.15 The EU’s High Representative Borrell criticised these attempts 
to discredit the EU and stigmatise its citizens.16 Trump also kept referring to the 
virus as a “foreign” or “Chinese” and later “Wuhan virus”. He downplayed criticism 
concerning his racialisation of the virus by claiming that he simply referred to the 
geographic starting point of the pandemic. However, statements such as that by 
Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton blaming China for purposefully spreading the virus 
and threatening to “hold accountable those who inflicted it on the world” show 
that this framing was far from objective, let alone innocent.17 
Instead of leading the global response, the Trump administration torpedoed mul-
tilateral efforts. In February, it proposed a $3 billion funding cut to global health 
programs for 2021.18 In mid-April, it froze all US funding for the World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO), accusing it of being biased towards the Chinese government. 
The US administration also stalled efforts in March to agree a G7 foreign ministers’ 
statement on the coronavirus crisis and a Declaration by the UN Security Council 
by insisting on the label “Wuhan virus”.
Europeans were particularly angered by some hostile expressions of an “Ameri-
ca First” approach. One was Trump’s unilateral imposition of a travel ban on Eu-
ropeans without prior consultation. The fact that it initially excluded the UK – a 
politically motivated measure reversed only three days later – added to the EU’s 
discontent.19 Another was the alleged attempt by the US to secure exclusive rights 
for the development of a coronavirus vaccine by the German biopharmaceutical 
company CureVac. It remains to be seen whether subsequent signs of goodwill, 
such as a shipment of medical goods worth $100 million to Italy, can heal this 
wound in transatlantic relations in the medium-term. 
The longer-term geopolitical implications depend on the outcome of the US presi-
dential elections scheduled to take place in November 2020. At this stage, one can 
only speculate about the impact of the escalating pandemic on that outcome. A 
victory of the Democratic contestant Joe Biden would probably lead to a return to 
liberal internationalism and multilateralism. This would likely change the Ameri-
can course on a range of geopolitical issues such as the Iran nuclear deal and trade. 
However, some issues would remain sources of transatlantic tensions regardless 
of the election outcome. The EU’s approach to China will be closely scrutinised by 
any US administration. If the economic downturn leads to substantial European 
defence budget cuts, as many analysts predict,20 we will likely see an entirely dif-
ferent dimension of the transatlantic burden-sharing debate. 
15 Orr, Gabi, Trump ratchets up coronavirus battle with European travel ban, Politico, 
11 March 2020. 
16 Borrell, Josep, The Coronavirus pandemic and the new world it is creating, Brussels, 
24 March 2020. 
17 Cotton, Tom, Press Release, 12 March 2020. 
18 United States Senate Budget Committee, The Trump budget devastates global and public 
health programs, 2020. 
19 Joint Statement by President von der Leyen and President Michel on the U.S. travel ban, 
Brussels, 12 March 2020. 
20 Fiott, Daniel, Will European defence survive Coronavirus? Real Instituto Elcano, 17 March 2020. 
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3 EU-Africa relations: the next strategic  
challenge? 
Relations with Africa are a key priority for the “geopolitical Commission”. The EU 
and its member states remain Africa’s biggest partners in terms of investment, 
trade, official development aid and security. Due to their geographic and cultural 
proximity, instability and fragility in Africa have direct consequences for Europe. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the new Commission President von der 
Leyen chose Africa and the African Union’s (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa for 
her first official visit in December 2019. As a follow-up, the EU issued a proposal 
for a new strategy with Africa in March,21 which lays the foundation for a novel 
EU-Africa partnership to be adopted on the occasion of the EU-AU summit in Oc-
tober 2020. EU foreign ministers have thus described 2020 as a “pivotal year” for 
EU-Africa relations.22 
At the beginning of the global pandemic, Africa was not in the international fo-
cus as case numbers were comparatively low. However, they are rising and due to 
limited testing facilities, the real figure is likely to be higher. Overall, Africa might 
not be as badly prepared as one might think. African countries have experience in 
dealing with infectious diseases and reacted relatively quickly to the coronavirus. 
As a result of the 2014 Ebola epidemic, several African countries have put in place 
specific procedures for fighting such epidemics and pan-African structures like the 
Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) have been estab-
lished. Through the Africa CDC, the AU has taken the first steps to addressing the 
pandemic. It has adopted a Joint Continental Strategy and established a specific 
Africa Task Force for the Coronavirus (AFCOR).23
Even so, the outbreak of the coronavirus will likely have severe longer-term ramifica-
tions for Africa.24 Dense population and the inability of many to self-quarantine for 
economic reasons may lead to a rapid spread of the virus in some areas. The poorest 
countries with weak public health systems and populations, already disproportion-
ately affected by infectious diseases, could face a real humanitarian disaster. 
While the magnitude of the health crisis in Africa is still uncertain, the economic 
fallout is already being felt. Demand for African raw materials and commodities 
has fallen, particularly due to lower demand from China and Europe. Moreover, the 
pandemic has temporarily stalled talks on the completion of the African Continen-
tal Free Trade Area, which was designed to boost internal trade and alleviate some 
of the continent’s dependencies on Europe and China, notably in the field of phar-
maceuticals.25 In addition, it is estimated that Africa could need up to $10.6 billion in 
unanticipated increases in health spending to stop the spread of the virus.26 African 
21 European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication, Towards a compre-
hensive Strategy with Africa, Brussels, 9 March 2020. 
22 Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 9 December 2019. 
23 African Union, Africa Joint Continental Strategy for COVID-19 outbreak, Addis Ababa, 
20 March 2020. 
24 Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth, Africa after COVID-19 and the retreat of globalism, South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), April 2020. 
25 Nyaira, Sandra, Ways Africa’s Free Trade Area could help mitigate effects of COVID-19, 
Africa Renewal, 25 March 2020. 
26 UN Economic Commission for Africa, ECA estimates billions worth losses in Africa due to 
COVID-19 impact, Addis Ababa, 13 March 2020. 
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governments have therefore called on the international community for the suspen-
sion of debt interest payments and an emergency economic stimulus.27
As a response, the UN launched a $2 billion global humanitarian response plan 
for the world’s most vulnerable countries28 and the G20 leaders have approved 
an economic aid package and debt relief.29 On 13 April, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) adopted a Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which provides a $500 million in grant-based debt service relief, mostly to coun-
tries in Africa.30 Following the appeal by France and Germany to the internation-
al community for a special effort to boost Africa’s coronavirus response31, the IMF 
announced on 17 April that it would scale-up financing and mobilise $18 billion 
for Africa in 2020 to fight against the pandemic and its economic fallout.32
The EU has tried to position itself as leader in terms of global solidarity when 
the Commission announced a €15.6 billion aid package to help developing coun-
tries and partners around the world cope with the humanitarian, health, social 
and economic consequences.33 The package combines redirected resources from 
the EU, the member states and financial institutions, particularly the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. Africa is to receive roughly one third of the funds and guarantees and is 
thus clearly a focus of the package. Announcing it, the EU stressed that “now is 
the time for international solidarity and leadership, not isolation” and that the 
“geopolitical Commission stands ready to spearhead this work”.34 
The magnitude of EU support for Africa contrasts with the approach of the Trump 
administration which, at the time of writing, had agreed a $274 million package 
for emergency health and humanitarian assistance for developing countries.35 
This clearly shows that, unlike in the Ebola crisis when the US had led an interna-
tional coalition to counter the spread of the disease, the Trump administration 
has refrained from taking a leading role in the coronavirus response.36
Meanwhile, China is trying to position itself as a defender of the developing coun-
tries and champion of South-South cooperation. It is actively supporting African 
countries in the fight against the pandemic. Alongside donating supplies such as 
masks, testing kits and protective suits to Africa, it has a track record in training 
27 UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Finance Ministers call for coordinated COVID-19 
response to mitigate adverse impact on economies and society, Addis Ababa, 23 March 2020. 
28 UN launches US $2billion global humanitarian response to fight COVID-19, Africa Renewal, 
25 March 2020, online. 
29 Marks, Simon, G20 prepares coronavirus rescue package for Africa, Politico, 4 February 2020. 
30 IMF Executive Board Approves Immediate Debt Relief for 25 Countries, IMF, Washington 
D.C., 13 April 2020. 
31 Only victory in Africa can end the pandemic everywhere, Op-ed, Financial Times, 14 April 2020. 
32 Kristalina Georgieva, Opening Remarks at High-Level Virtual Event on ‘Mobilizing with 
Africa’, IMF, Washington D.C., 17 April 2020. 
33 European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication, Communication 
on the Global EU response to COVID-19, Brussel 8 April 2020. 
34 European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication, Communication 
on the Global EU response to COVID-19, Brussel 8 April 2020. 
35 Coronavirus- Africa: The US is leading the Humanitarian and Health Assistance Reponse to 
COVID-19, Africanews, 3 April 2020. 
36 Campbell, Kurt M. and Doshi, Rush, The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order, China 
is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters, Foreign Affairs, 
18 March 2020. 
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medical professionals in Africa.37 China has not only proposed transforming its 
grand strategy of a “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) into a “Health Silk Road”38 in 
order to provide technical support and share experience with Africa39 in fighting 
against the pandemic, but it also supports the New Development Bank to help 
emerging and developing countries, like South Africa,40 deal with the economic 
consequences of the pandemic. 
4 Policy recommendations 
The above examples show that the geopolitical implications of the pandemic are 
wide-ranging. While the EU is painfully discovering internal and external obsta-
cles to its sovereignty, it is falling prey to a global battle of narratives led by the 
US and China. China’s attempts to portray itself as a champion of global solidarity 
have not only benefitted from the EU’s divisions, but also from the US’s complete 
lack of global leadership. Meanwhile, the pandemic will likely hit the world’s poor-
est nations – many in the EU’s direct neighbourhood – hardest. This will only ag-
gravate existing conflicts and tensions. 
The pandemic represents an opportunity for global and responsible EU leadership. 
More than before, the EU will have to defend the rules-based multilateral order, 
champion free trade and promote global solidarity. As the world’s largest trading 
bloc and collective donor, the EU is not only well-placed, but almost doomed to 
play this leading role. Even though the EU’s primary focus now rightly lies on inter-
nal solidarity and immediate economic responses,41 Europeans should adapt their 
geopolitical agenda and prepare for the pandemic’s aftermath. The following four 
paths should be explored. 
4.1  Defend and promote the European model in the global battle  
of narratives
 
The pandemic illustrates the power and danger of disinformation campaigns. The 
EU has been particularly vulnerable in this battle of narratives thanks to the lack 
of mutual solidarity at the outset of the crisis. So, first and foremost, more must 
be done to restore that mutual solidarity in the political and economic domains.42 
37 Grande, Allison with S. Fischer and J. Sayre, Chinese Medical Teams: Knowledge Transfer in 
Ethiopia and Malawi, SAIS China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), Washington D.C., March 2020. 
38 Xu, Yixiang, Reviving China’s Health Silk Road Initiative? Battle of Narrative and Challenges 
for Transatlantic Leadership, AICGS, Washington D.C., 30 March 2020.
39 China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China and African Coun-
tries Jointly Fight Against COVID-19, Beijing, 23 March 2020. 
40 The BRICS bank is ready to lend SA $1bn to fight the COVID-19, Daily Maverick, Johannes-
burg, 5 April 2020. 
41 For recommendations on fiscal response measures, see Grund, Sebastian; Guttenberg, 
Lucas; Odendahl, Christian, Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis: A pandemic solidarity in-
strument for the EU, Policy Paper, Jacques Delors Centre, 7 April 2020. 
42 Maillard, Sébastien; Chopin, Thierry; Koenig, Nicole, L’UE face au coronavirus : l’indispen-
sable incarnation politique de la solidarité européenne, Policy Brief, Institut Jacques Delors, 
April 2020; 
Grund, Sebastian; Guttenberg, Lucas; Odendahl, Christian, Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis: 
A pandemic solidarity instrument for the EU, Policy Paper, Jacques Delors Centre, 7 April 2020. 
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To defend itself in the global battle of narratives, the EU needs a well-coordinat-
ed communications strategy. Countering false information with facts, as Com-
mission President von der Leyen and High Representative Borrell have done or 
via fact-checking sites such as euvsdisinfo.eu, is an important starting point. Yet, 
there should also be more offensive, fact-based communication about the soli-
darity measures the EU is taking internally and externally. For these messages to 
reach EU and global publics, this communications strategy must be coordinat-
ed among EU Institutions and with the member states. The EU and the member 
states should make use of their broad network of diplomatic representations to 
enhance the visibility of the European contribution to global solidarity. In addi-
tion, the EU should bolster its added value in countering disinformation. This could 
entail strengthening the role for the EEAS East StratCom Task Force and broaden-
ing its geographic focus allowing for greater attention to Chinese disinformation 
campaigns.43 
Promoting the European model amidst systemic rivalry also entails keeping a 
close eye on the emergency measures undertaken by member states and partners. 
In their Joint Roadmap of 8 April, the Commission and Council Presidents called for 
a coordinated exit strategy from these measures. They underlined that the states 
of emergency, proclaimed in half of the member states, should gradually be re-
placed by more targeted ones to ensure democratic accountability.44 Monitoring 
these measures, the EU should put its entire rule of law toolbox to work. However, 
the ineffectiveness of this toolbox in the Hungarian case shows that more and 
more explicit peer pressure is needed by the member states and Europe’s political 
families. More than half of the member states did not sign a declaration warning 
Budapest to stick to the rule of law45 while the European People’s Party, once more, 
failed to expel Orbán’s Fidesz party. Sticking to EU values internally is a precon-
dition to credibly promoting them externally at a time when players like China 
promote an entirely different model. 
4.2 Double down on European strategic sovereignty 
The pandemic illustrates the limitations of European strategic sovereignty in the 
health and economic spheres. The resulting disruption of supply chains underlined 
the EU’s dependence on China when it comes to medical and technological prod-
ucts. The attempted takeover of CureVac highlighted its vulnerability to foreign in-
vestors. More broadly, an undervaluation of Europe’s stock markets could tempt 
external actors, notably China, to solidify their grip on Europe’s strategic infrastruc-
ture. The EU has already taken other some important measures in response to the 
crisis. Examples include the launch of the joint procurement mechanism for medi-
cal goods, the establishment of the first ever common European reserve of medical 
equipment and the provision of an €80 million grant to CureVac by the EIB. 
However, more decisive measures are needed to strengthen the EU’s health and 
economic sovereignty in a post-crisis context. These should include the consider-
ation of further delegation of competences in the field of health to the EU level. 
The EU should also bolster the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Con-
43 See Kask, Maarja, False information about coronavirus and beyond: Lessons for the EU? 
Policy Brief, Jacques Delors Centre, 9 April 2020. 
44 Von der Leyen, Ursula and Michel, Charles, Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 
containment measures, 15 April 2020. 
45 See here.
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trol. The agency currently only has around 300 staff, a small fraction of the 9.000 
staff employed by its US counterpart.46 To safeguard its economic sovereignty, 
the EU should accelerate the establishment of the Foreign Investment Screening 
Mechanism that should be applicable as of October 2020. On 25 March 2020, the 
Commission responded to the coronavirus pandemic by issuing guidance to the 
member states and suggested to include healthcare-related industries in nation-
al frameworks.47 However, there is still too much divergence among the member 
states. While some like Italy, Spain and Germany tightened their frameworks in 
light of the crisis, half of them still haven’t established one. As suggested by Elvire 
Fabry, the Commission should issue more detailed guidance combining short-term 
measures regarding the inclusion of healthcare-related sectors and longer-term 
ones aiming at greater harmonisation and effectiveness of national systems.48 
Despite a foreseeable focus on the geo-economic dimension of European sover-
eignty, the EU should pursue efforts to enhance its strategic sovereignty in secu-
rity and defence matters. The global challenges and dynamics that led the EU to 
prioritise this domain in the past few years have far from disappeared. The EU can 
expect a rise in requests for civil-military assistance in its broader neighbourhood. 
The pandemic could deepen the divergence of threat perceptions between mem-
ber states focusing on classical deterrence and the East and those more interested 
in the South and crisis management. In addition, we could face substantial and 
uncoordinated defence budget cuts. In theory, these should incite greater Euro-
pean cooperation, but the negotiations on the next multi-annual financial frame-
work rather suggest that EU-level funding for defence cooperation will be dramat-
ically cut.49 Europeans should keep defence cooperation high on the agenda, not 
least to contribute their fair share to NATO’s European pillar and pre-empt a new 
escalation of the transatlantic burden-sharing debate. It should use the proposed 
“Strategic Compass” process to bridge member state differences on the EU’s level 
of ambition in a context of financial constraints. 
4.3 Fill the leadership gap on multilateralism 
Back in 2003, the European Security Strategy called for Europe to contribute to an 
international order based on “effective multilateralism”. In the global coronavirus 
pandemic, the world is, for the first time in modern history, confronted with a 
threat on a scale that only multilateral solutions can effectively solve. Yet, over 
the past years the global multilateral system has come under increasing pressure, 
mostly because of a lack of US global leadership. Thus, the EU needs to fill this gap. 
As highlighted by the EU’s High Representative Borrell, the EU is ready to step in.50 
To do so, the EU put forward a “Team Europe” approach. This approach provides a 
single framework of action for the EU’s external response to the coronavirus crisis, 
 
46 Marchais, Isabell, Health: a highly perfectible European added value for the EU, Jacques 
Delors Institute, Paris, March 2020.
47 European Commission, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct invest-
ment and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s stra-
tegic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), 
Brussels, 25 March 2020. 
48 See forthcoming policy paper by Elvire Fabry on foreign direct investment screening, 
Jacques Delors Institute, Paris. 
49 Brzozowksi, Alexandra, Europe’s military mobility: latest casualty of EU budget battle, 
EurActiv, 25 February 2020. 
50 Borrell, Josep, Four Priorities for a Global Pandemic Strategy, Project Syndicate, 30 March 2020. 
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by combining the contributions and resources from all EU institutions and EU 
member states. As part of the “Team Europe for global coordination and multilat-
eralism”, the EU wants to position itself “as a global actor and major contributor 
to the international aid system to promote a coordinated global response, notably 
in the framework of the G7, the G20 and at the United Nations”.51 
Given China’s efforts to fill the void left by the US, the EU needs to show global 
leadership by promoting a rules-based multilateral order and strengthening in-
ternational institutions. For this purpose, the EU needs to closely coordinate with 
its member states, like Germany and France, that have launched initiatives such 
as the Alliance for Multilateralism.52 Moreover, it needs to reach out to its interna-
tional partners. Given the anti-multilateralism stance of the current Trump admin-
istration, the EU should engage with China in the spirit of “principled pragmatism” 
that the 2016 EU Global Strategy foresees. This would also imply remaining criti-
cal of the “One-China policy” and exploring Taiwan’s possible membership of the 
WHO, Taiwan having successfully stemmed the spread of the coronavirus without 
resorting to the same kind of draconian measures as mainland China. At the same 
time, the EU and China should join forces to fill the funding gap left by the recent 
withdrawal of the US from the WHO.
The EU should not only support multilateral health measures through the WHO, 
but also initiate economic solutions through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
the G20, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB). In its attempt to foster multilateral solutions, the EU should 
reach out to other important economic partners. As suggested by Kevin Rudd “a 
core group of constructive powers among the G20 should act to reform, fund, and 
politically defend the central institutions of global governance for the post-Cov-
id era”53. This group should be led by the EU and joined by others such as Japan, 
South Korea, Canada, as well as the UK and Singapore. 
A first step in this direction has been the EU’s recent initiative to organise support 
to create a temporary trade dispute settlement mechanism to bypass the WTO cri-
ses caused by the US54. This sends a strong signal of support for a multilateral trad-
ing system and could strengthen the WTO’s response to the pandemic as a trade 
facilitator for essential goods such as medical supplies, food, and energy55. Given 
that several member states have joined the China-led AIIB, the EU should close-
ly follow its new crisis recovery facility56 for the coronavirus pandemic and make 
sure that it is compatible with multilateral measures decided within the G20 and 
other fora. Moreover, the EU should foster coordination between the AIIB and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) to support a rapid economic recovery post-crisis. 
51 European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication, Communication 
on the Global EU response to COVID-19, Brussel 8 April 2020. 
52 Permanent Mission of France to the UN, Who, if not us? An alliance for multilateralism, 
New York, 14 February 2020. 
53 Rudd, Kevin, Kevin Rudd on America, China and saving the WHO, The Economist, 15 April 2020.
54 EU, China and 15 other agree temporary fix to WTO crisis, Reuters, 24 January 2020. 
55 World Trade Organisation (WTO), WTO, WCO chiefs pledge joint efforts to facilitate trade in 
essential goods, Geneva, 6 April 2020, online. 
56 China-backed AIIB proposes $5bln financing line to deal with coronavirus crisis, Reuters, 
3 April 2020, online. 
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4.4 Engage in trilateral cooperation with China and Africa 
The coronavirus pandemic serves as a reminder of China’s expanding footprint 
in Africa. Since 2008, the EU has made efforts to respond to China’s South-South 
diplomacy in Africa by engaging in so-called trilateral cooperation.57 Despite the 
growing rivalry between the EU and China, the EU reiterated its call for such tri-
lateral cooperation last year.58 So far, African partners have been rather sceptical 
of these efforts, criticising the lack of African ownership.59 Both the EU and China 
have, however, recognised that collaboration efforts must be demand-driven. As 
outlined by Stefano Manservisi, former Director-General for International Cooper-
ation and Development at the European Commission, the unexpected scale and 
unique nature of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as insufficient multilateral 
efforts, call for “innovative forms of international development collaboration“.60 
The African Union, as well as single African heads of state and government, might 
therefore reconsider their standpoint and welcome joint support by the EU and 
China to help Africa tackle the coronavirus. The EU’s High Representative Borrell 
and State Councillor Wang Yi have already expressed their willingness to cooper-
ate in helping Africa.61
The upcoming EU-AU summit could be an opportunity for the EU to respond to 
China’s diplomacy of South-South cooperation and to demonstrate to its African 
partners that it is serious about establishing a new long-term partnership. To do 
so, the EU needs to show that it can live up to the expectations raised by its recent 
Africa strategy and start discussing how to build a strong EU-Africa partnership 
that can help the continent deal with the long-term challenges stemming from 
the pandemic. In addition to focusing on the “Partnership for Sustainable Growth 
and Jobs” and helping increase Africa’s access to health care, the EU and the AU 
should explore how to integrate China into their efforts. Endeavours of trilateral 
cooperation, if well prepared, would come at the right time, as the EU will also 
hold its summit with China in autumn. 
57 Council Conclusions on trilateral dialogue and cooperation between the EIU, China and 
Africa, Brussels, 10 November 2008. 
58 European Commission and EU High Representative, EU-China- A Strategic Outlook, Brussels, 
12 March 2019.
59 Stahl, Anna, EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World, Hic Sunt Dracones, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
60 Manservisi, Stefano, COVID-19: A Stress Test for International Development, Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI), Rome, April 2020.
61 European External Action Service (EEAS), China: High Representative/Vice-President speaks 
to State Councillor/Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Brussels, 3 April 2020.
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Conclusion
The pandemic has accelerated some of the global trends that pushed the Euro-
pean Commission to present itself as ‘geopolitical’. At the same time, it has illus-
trated the key challenge the EU faces in this endeavour: the close link between 
internal unity and cohesion and the ability to project power globally. For instance, 
the EU needs to put in place internal solidarity if it is to influence the global bat-
tle of narratives. Moreover, the EU can only credibly undertake systemic rivalry 
with countries like China and Russia if it is able to defend its own values within 
its own boundaries. The pandemic has, moreover, underlined that the EU needs 
to work on its strategic sovereignty and that its global leadership is now needed 
more than ever. 
While many observing the pandemic’s global implications are pessimistic as of 
now, there are at least two reasons for EU analysts to be optimistic. First, EU inte-
gration has often progressed as a result of crises. Second, EU external action tends 
to become more cohesive and effective beyond the early phases of crisis response. 
Either way, examination of the triangle between the US, China, and Africa under-
lines that the EU’s structural, regulatory, and normative power will be needed in 
the global aftermath of this crisis. 
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